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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-605-141) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, VANASKIE and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 30, 2012) 
___________ 
 




 Yaroslav Bodnaruk petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration 




 Bodnaruk is a Ukrainian citizen who entered the United States without inspection 
in 2001 and who concedes that he is removable on that basis.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  He applied for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture on the ground that he suffered persecution by reason of his 
Baptist religion and fears such treatment in the future.  He supported his claim with, inter 
alia, an expert report and background evidence concerning the treatment of Baptists in the 
Ukraine.  (A.R. 286-93, 333-444.)  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Bodnaruk‟s 
application and ordered his removal to the Ukraine, subject to his ability to voluntarily 
depart, and the BIA dismissed his appeal on November 9, 2009.  We denied his petition 
for review of that ruling.  See Bodnaruk v. Att‟y Gen., 397 F. App‟x 805 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Shortly thereafter, Bodnaruk filed the motion to reopen with the BIA at issue here.  
He acknowledged that the motion was untimely but argued that it fell within the 
exception to the time limitation for motions based on materially changed country 
conditions.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  In particular, 
he argued that various articles and country reports showed that conditions for Baptists in 
the Ukraine had deteriorated since his hearing before the IJ.  The BIA disagreed and 
denied his motion as untimely on July 22, 2011.  The BIA concluded that the incidents of 
societal violence described in Bodnaruk‟s new evidence were substantially similar to 
those described in the evidence he submitted to the IJ, that only one 2008 report of 
suspected arson even mentioned conduct directed at Baptists, and that the new evidence 
showed that, if anything, conditions had improved because the Ukrainian government 
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recently increased the penalty for hate crimes by legislation enacted in 2010.  Bodnaruk 
petitions for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we review the denial of 
reopening for abuse of discretion.  See Liu v. Att‟y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 
2009).  We will not disturb the BIA‟s ruling unless it is “„arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 
to law.‟”  Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  We 
review the BIA‟s underlying assessment of the record for substantial evidence and may 
not disturb it unless “„any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.‟”  Liu, 555 F.3d at 148 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).   
 We read Bodnaruk‟s brief to challenge the BIA‟s ruling on two grounds, but each 
lacks merit.  First, Bodnaruk appears to take issue with the BIA‟s assessment of his 
evidence by asserting that it shows an escalation of violence against religious minorities 
in general and Baptists in particular.  Our own review, however, confirms that the BIA‟s 
assessment is supported by substantial evidence.  Only one of Bodnaruk‟s recent articles 
even mentions Baptists (A.R. 29), and neither that article nor Bodnaruk‟s other evidence 
compels the conclusion that conditions in the Ukraine have materially changed.  To the 
contrary, we agree with the BIA that Bodnaruk‟s recent evidence (A.R. 22-85) describes 
conditions that are substantially the same as those described in the evidence he previously 
submitted to the IJ (A.R. 286-93, 333-444).   
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 Second, Bodnaruk argues that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to set forth 
a legal standard for determining whether country conditions have materially changed and 
that the BIA‟s ruling is effectively unreviewable in the absence of such a standard.  As 
support, Bodnaruk cites authority for the general proposition that the BIA is required to 
explain the rationale for its rulings.  See, e.g., Lin v. U.S. Dep‟t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 
192 (2d Cir. 2005).  But the BIA did just that.  The BIA cited the governing regulation 
regarding changed country conditions, and applied the appropriate standard for 
evaluating a changed country conditions claim.  That standard requires that the BIA 
“„demonstrate that it has considered [the claimant‟s] evidence, even if only to dismiss 
it.  In doing so, the BIA should provide us with more than cursory, summary or 
conclusory statements, so that we are able to discern its reasons for declining to afford 
relief to a petitioner.‟”  Zheng, 549 F.3d at 268 (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 
(2d Cir. 2006)).  In the present case, the BIA acknowledged Bodnaruk‟s new evidence, 
accurately summarized its contents, compared it with Bodnaruk's previous evidence, and 
explained why the new evidence did not show that conditions have changed since 
Bodnaruk's hearing before the IJ.  No more was required of it. 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
